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Bubbles, Busts, and Blame
by

R O B E R T H O C K E T T, P R O F E S S O R O F L AW, C O R N E L L L AW S C H O O L

Ours are tough times for the image of bankers and other financial professionals. The harms
being suffered by many on “Main Street” are of obscure origin to most who inhabit that
Arcadian precinct. Folk sense that “Wall Street” has something to do with their pain, but
know little if anything more than that. Inexplicable pain of this sort seems quite often to

Professor Whitehead
also takes on this topic
on page 18.

issue in blame. There is a natural urge to know why one is suffering, after all; and when we
can point to some devil or scapegoat in some such mysterious, alien locale as “the banks”
or “the financial district,” the pain grows apparently somewhat more bearable. It is not
then the product of victims’—or public—incompetence. Yes, as seductive explanatory stories
go, bad guy cupidity beats good guy stupidity hands down.

I am happy enough to concede there were “bad guys” involved
in our most recent experience of speculative mania and subsequent meltdown. There always are in such cases. Nor do I doubt
there was plenty of “good guy” stupidity here too. There always
is in such cases. What seems to me more interesting, however,
is how inessential these presences—which again always are with
us, in good times and bad—are to explaining what happened.
There’s no need to blame any market actor, or even any market,
in accounting for what happened. The relevant story is elsewhere. I think it will be useful to tell it. That will be fairer both
to the innocents—the great majority, after all—and to the cause
of our fi nding such cures as can prevent a recurrence.
So what is this “relevant story?” What we have just been through,
I believe, is a classic asset price bubble and burst. And these
bubbles and bursts, I shall argue, are best viewed as near textbook cases of collective action problems. The hallmark of such
problems is this: multiple acts even of ethically unobjectionable
individual rationality aggregate into collectively irrational—even
calamitous—outcomes. The wearisomely familiar “prisoner’s
dilemma” that graces most game theory texts of course is the
best known example—unless that be the likewise familiar
“tragedy of the commons.” But there are many others, some only
marginally less familiar, worth recalling: arms races, bank runs,
economy-wide layoffs, “liquidity traps,” recessionary spirals—
even consumer price inflations, to name but a few.
It doesn’t seem widely appreciated that asset price bubbles and
busts are of the same form—indeed, that they are effectively hyper-
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inflations. That is a pity. For once we see this, we no longer feel
certain that there must be scoundrels or idiots behind every travail
like that we’re now suffering. We become less inclined to cast
blame. We turn instead to the search for constructive solutions.
Let us talk fi rst about asset price bubbles and bursts, then. After
that I shall speak of solutions.
Asset price bubbles and bursts, along with the credit and monetary contractions that characteristically follow them, recur with
depressing regularity through the course of fi nancial history.1
The same regularity characterizes the soul-searching and lessonseeking that seem always to follow these cataclysms.2 Given
the regularity both of these occurrences and of our subsequent
efforts to diagnose and treat them, one might have hoped we’d
have reached “the end of [this] history” by now. Yet it seems we
have not. Why?
One reason might be that each asset price bubble bears its own
characteristic features. In particular, each bears its own underlying asset or set of such assets, and its own species of fi nancial
chicanery that seem always to come to light just as each bubble’s
limits are neared.3 Hence it never is easy to predict the precise
place the next bubble might begin to inflate, or where fi nancial
abuses are apt to occur. There is surely some truth in this hypothesis. Financial regulators seem doomed often to plan for the
last crisis much as generals are said to plan for the last war. Yet I
doubt that this truth is the relevant truth we are after, for reasons
I’ll presently explain.
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All that is needed for the whole sorry “bipolar” process to
get underway is for a comparatively small, critical mass
of best-at-the-time, yet nevertheless ill-founded-(only)-inretrospect, bets to be placed. A spontaneously emergent
“pyramid” or Ponzi process, which requires no “scheme”
and no Ponzi, will then do the rest.

Another, more apposite reason for asset price bubbles’ regular
recurrence might be our tendency, precisely by dint of our inclination to probe the unique characteristics of each new bubble and
burst that occur, to overlook the invariant foundational structure
that all asset price bubbles share. This tendency is especially
pronounced when influential lay and expert opinion alike—
including, conspicuously, regulatory opinion—harbor views of
fi nancial markets that they erroneously take to be incompatible
either with the existence or, by way of fallback position, with the
pre-crash discernibility, of any such “foundational structure.”4
My own view, I have intimated, is that there is an invariant
structure common to all asset price bubbles and bursts; that this
structure is discernible even while bubbles are in the process
of inflating; and that popular lay, professional, and regulatory
opinion have lost sight of it owing to two misapprehensions.
Those are that asset price bubbles and/or their detectability prior
to bursts would be incompatible with (1) efficiency on the part of
fi nancial markets, and/or (2) rationality on the part of market
actors. The efficiency hypothesis in turn seems both theoretically warranted and empirically well corroborated; while systematic
irrationality for its part seems wildly implausible, not to say
oxymoronic in the very naming. And so, the line of thought that
I have in mind here concludes, it is the suggestion that bubbles
are possible or detectable at all that must be rejected. Call these
the “efficiency-incompatibility” and “rationality-incompatibility”
theses, respectively.
Why do I say “misapprehension” in connection with these two
theses? Two reasons. First, because the kind of efficiency that is
in play when we speak of efficient capital markets is primarily, at
least in the short run, informational efficiency, while only derivatively—and in the longer run, with plenty of pitfalls along the
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way—allocative efficiency. What the markets do efficiently in the
short run, in other words, is to impound price-relevant information.
And the “information” in question here notoriously excludes
potential value-relevant data that simply remains, for indefi nite
periods of time, unavailable.
The information that capital markets efficiently aggregate excludes,
in other words, the stuff of radical “Knightian” or “Keynes
Chapter 12” uncertainty. That is data in respect of which market
participants must in effect take positions, but which positions
in turn have to be decided on the basis of generally serviceable
conventions and heuristics, “best guesses,” “gut feelings,” or
even “animal spirits” rather than plausibly assignable probability
distributions. These are the kinds of decision that a still very few
pathfi nders now seek to model through non-probabilistic “infogap” decision theory, rather than Bayesian models of the sort
suited to actuarial “risk” as distinguished from uncertainty.5
And perhaps unsurprisingly, the jury will be out for a while on
whether these new non-Bayesian models can handle Knightian
uncertainty any better than do the old Bayesian stalwarts.
It also is important to understand informational efficiency not
only in respect of what it excludes, but likewise in respect of
what it includes: that “information” notoriously includes, again
at least in the short run, both (1) advertently and inadvertently
propagated “misinformation” nicely suited to fi lling the gap that
is Knightian uncertainty, and relatedly (2) “beautiful baby” and
cognate forms of “noise” information. It includes, that is to say,
information about how others are presently valuing the asset in
question via their trading behavior, which itself can in turn be
the product of how yet others appear to be presently valuing the
asset in question via their trading behavior, and so on . . . etc.6
Price movements prompted by trading on this sort of informa-
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tion can, of course, readily become self-amplifying—the very
antithesis of self-equilibrating.
Where efficient informational inclusion is concerned, in other
words, positive feedback loops can amplify and distort, at least
for several-year intervals, the more accurate “fundamental value”
signals that informationally efficient market prices tend in the
longer run to convey. Think of them as the positive flipside of
those self-fulfillingly prophetic “runs” on assets that always
follow on bubbles, the stuff of “busts.” For that is just what they
are—they are “bank runs in reverse,” so to speak.7 All that is
needed for the whole sorry “bipolar” process to get underway is
for a comparatively small, critical mass of best-at-the-time, yet
nevertheless ill-founded-(only)-in-retrospect, bets to be placed.
A spontaneously emergent “pyramid” or Ponzi process, which
requires no “scheme” and no Ponzi, will then do the rest.8 The
oft-encountered quips of wags, pundits, and too many scholars to
the contrary notwithstanding, little to none of this is in tension
with the informational efficiency hypothesized by the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis.9
So much for the efficiency-incompatibility thesis. How about the
putative rationality-incompatibility of asset price bubbles? Well,
just as asset price bubbles are not incompatible with the relevant
form of “efficiency” thought to characterize asset markets, neither are they with the relevant form of “rationality.” Once again,
much popular parlance to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
no tension between rationality on the part of individual financial
market actors, on the one hand, and occasionally calamitous
outcomes of interactions among multiple such actors on the other
hand. To suppose that there is is to commit a fallacy of composition—to confuse a whole with the unstructured sum of its parts.
It is also to overlook the commonplace, long familiar to game
theory and folk wisdom alike, that multiple acts of individual
rationality can under some circumstances aggregate into forms
of collective irrationality.
Indeed, our recent bubble and burst in mortgage-backed securities and associated financial instruments, just like previous asset
price bubbles, can readily be modeled as a variant of the familiar
“prisoners’ dilemma” and “chicken” games regularly encountered
in microeconomic and game theory texts.10 In particular, it can
be viewed as the upshot of a stylized game of James Dean-style
drag race “chicken.”11
In my version of the game, justifiably self-confident, forward-wise
blindfolded contestants drive speedily toward a cliff’s edge
known to be far distant but not how far distant. They are paid by

the foot to proceed for as long as—but only for as long as—they
outpace others whom they can see to their sides and behind.
Finally, they know there are multiple safety nets over the cliff’s
edge in any case for at least some who don’t manage to “bail”
in time to avoid going over. It is far from clear that there’s any
irrationality on the part of any participant in this game. Each
stands a good chance of bailing before going over, and of falling
into a net if she does. And each stands to grow rich on the way.
The blindfolds in my stylized game of course correspond to the
radical uncertainty that attaches to any bubble’s limit point; even
those who know we’re in bubble territory know that there’s
generally no way to know when the party will end. Payment by
the foot corresponds to the fact that all players grow richer the
closer they draw to the endpoint, legging the spread between
low borrowing costs and high capital gains rates. Finally, the
nets of course correspond to the bailouts that many know they
are apt to receive. No asset price bubble or bust over the past
millennium fails to feature these characteristics.
And it is precisely here, I suggest, that we find the “basic structure” to which I have referred—the structure that’s common to
all asset price bubbles and bursts. When bubbles develop and
inflate per this structure, all manner of behavior that ordinarily
looks profligate or cavalier comes to look rather more prudent
and prosaic. Purchasing a home or related asset with a lowfront-end, “balloon”-rate mortgage, for example, looks sensible;
for throughout the bubble’s duration you can always cheaply
refinance your loan on the strength of the rapidly appreciating
collateral—the house or other asset—before the balloon rate
kicks in. Lending to borrowers with less stellar credit histories
looks safer for the same reason—the collateral’s continually rising
price offsets the added default risk—so credit continues to flow,

Once the limit point is reached, however, all turn
abruptly and retrace their steps in reverse. The
bubble deflates down the same path along which
it inflated. The race back to the starting line
artificially deflates asset values just as the race
to the cliff’s edge artificially inflated them—even
good assets are viewed as lemons.
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and debt rates continue to grow. Like remarks hold in respect of
the good ratings that mortgage-backed instruments received
for a while, and of the relaxed attitudes shown by some of our
piecemeal—non-“systemic”—regulators like the SEC. For again,
the hallmark of that collective action problem known as an asset
price bubble just is that each actor’s actions are indeed rational,
so long as all other actors remain able to keep acting as they have
been acting. And it is only when indefinitely extensible credit’s
never-precisely-foreseeable limit-point is reached that the latter
proviso can no longer be counted on.
Once the limit point is reached, however, all turn abruptly and
retrace their steps in reverse. The bubble deflates down the same
path along which it inflated. The race back to the starting line
artificially deflates asset values just as the race to the cliff’s edge
artificially inflated them—even good assets are viewed as lemons. Previously boom-sustained debt now becomes “overhang,”
no longer supported by highly market-valued collateral. Defaults
ensue, first among borrowers, then among their lenders, then
among lenders to lenders, and so on. Credit contracts systemwide, just as mercurially as it formerly expanded. Business
investment soon follows suit. Firms tighten belts, employees are
laid off, consumer expenditures thus drop, firms accordingly
contract further, and so on—as the boom’s feedback process
morphs into the bust’s feedback process. Same collective action
problem, now tacking south rather than north.
So there we have bubbles and busts and their structure. How
about solutions?
Solutions to collective action problems, unsurprisingly, require
collective agents—agents who act in the name of all to render it
no longer individually rational for non-collective actors to make
decisions that aggregate into collectively irrational outcomes. In
effect, that is how the Fed and Treasury behaved in the autumn
of 2008 during the downside. TARP recouped most of its bailout
moneys precisely because it brought into one portfolio securities
that were undervalued by holders of multiple portfolios during
the “downside” collective action problem that is a bust. But what
about the “upside”—who serves as collective agent during a
“boom” or a bubble?
That, I maintain, would be a macro-prudential, or “systemic risk,”
regulator—an authority charged with overseeing and modulating price behavior in the credit-monetary-financial system as a
whole rather than simply one sector of it. In particular, this regulator would monitor both (1) the growth of leverage rates across
the economy as a whole and (2) the growth of spreads between
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market prices on the one hand and proxies for “fundamental”
value on the other. As those rates and spreads moved into selfamplifying territory, she would steadily tighten credit, increasingly tax short term capital gains, or both. There are multiple
levers by which this can be done—including Federal Funds rate
management, open market operations, reserve requirements,
capital regulation, deposit insurance charges, “Tobin” taxation,
and others.12 But in order for it to be done, the regulator must of
course understand her role as a collective agent—a desideratum
that sits in some tension with devotion to, say, the ideology of
Ayn Rand.13
We had something much like the required collective agent overseeing the credit-monetary-financial system for a surprisingly
lengthy, more or less bubble-free while: the Fed in the course of
the 1950s, early-to-mid-1960s, and early-to-mid-1980s, when
the likes of Chairmen William McChesney Martin and, later,
Paul Volcker took seriously the Fed’s role as countercyclical macroeconomic stabilizer.14 Both of those well regarded custodians
of our credit-money system seem to have understood the systemic prisoners’-dilemma-like structure of asset price bubbles
and consumer price inflations alike.15 And so both employed the
Fed’s principal systemic levers to “lean against the wind” and
“take away the punch bowl just as the party was getting good” in
order to stabilize asset and consumer price inflations.16 Volcker’s
immediate successor, Chairman Greenspan, alas, saw things
differently, succumbing by turns to the efficiency- and rationalityincompatibility theses that I sought to dispel just above. Unless
and until we fully reinstate the Fed’s—or some counterpart
systemic regulator’s, such as the new Dodd-Frank-instituted
Systemic Risk Council’s—role as envisaged by such former
chairs as Martin and Volcker, I fear, we are probably destined to
continue our cycle of repeated asset price bubbles and bursts,
with all the lost wealth and lost health and “lost decades” that
this always seems to entail.17
We could pull that off partly by choosing our Fed chairs more
wisely than we did from the late 1980s until recently. More
securely, we would clarify the Fed’s mandate to make clear that
overheated asset price inflation, as measured against suitable
proxies for “fundamental value” (such as home building costs
and rental rates in frothy housing market areas), is as inimical as
is consumer price inflation to those “stable prices” that the Fed
already is charged with “promoting.”18 Ultimately, however,
we’ll have also to bring more institutions and markets—notably
hedge funds, money funds, repo and currency markets—under
the credit-supervisory umbrella. For, unlike in Martin’s and

…the primary remedial end seems to me clear:
close spreads between borrowing rates on
the one hand, and bubble-sized asset price
inflation rates—as operationally distinguished
from “fundamental” value appreciation rates—
on the other.

even in Volcker’s day, in our day it’s no longer commercial banks
that are the principal sources of bubble-fueling credit.
Whatever the means upon which we ultimately agree, the primary remedial end seems to me clear: close spreads between
borrowing rates on the one hand, and bubble-sized asset price
inflation rates—as operationally distinguished from “fundamental” value appreciation rates—on the other. To do that
requires fi rst that we recognize bubbles’ and busts’ compatibility
with informational efficiency, market actor rationality, and,
indeed, even absence of blame. Q

6.“Beautiful baby” and “noise” information originate, respectively, with Keynes, supra note 5
at 156, and Fischer Black,“Noise,” 41 J. Fin. 529 (1986). For more on all of this, see again
Hockett, supra note 3.
7. See again Hockett,“Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3 for much more on this.
8. A fair bit has been written of late on positive feedback loops in asset pricing and their
roles in bubble-inflation. See, e.g., Franklin Allen et al.,“Beauty Contests and Iterated
Expectations in Financial Markets,” 19 Rev. Fin. Stud. 719 (2006). A superb synthesis of his
own many illuminating articles on the matter is Hyun Song Shin, Risk and Liquidity (2010).
See also Hockett, supra note 3, and Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0 (working paper) for
much more on the matter. The idea of a “naturally occurring Ponzi process” of course figures
prominently in Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2000).
9. See, of course, Eugene Fama,“Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work,” 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970). Also Eugene Fama,“Efficient Markets: II,” 46 J. Fin. 1575 (1991).

1. Pun on “depressing” foreseen but not intended. For histories of financial crises and
ensuing contractions, see, e.g., Charles Kindleberger’s classic, now in its 5th edition with a
new coauthor, Charles P. Kindleberger & Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A
History of Financial Crises (5th ed., 2005). Another recent treatment, this one a bit more
teched-up with quantitative analyses, is Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, This
Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2009).
2. For two early—not to say diverting—examples, see, e.g., Joseph de la Vega, Confusión de
Confusiones (Martin S. Fridson ed., 1996 [1688]), and Charles MacKay, Extraordinary Popular
Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (Martin S. Fridson ed., 1996 [1841]).
3. The chicanery, as it happens, seems seldom if ever to constitute a significant cause of
asset price bubbles or bursts, only a symptom that manifests late in the game. See Robert
Hockett,“A Fixer-Upper for Finance,” 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1213 (2010).
4. Call the first view the “ontic” view, and the second view the “epistemic” fallback. Former
Fed Chairman Greenspan, for one, appears to have held each of these views at various
points of his tenure.
5. Much more on this in Hockett,“Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3. On “Knightian” uncertainty,
see of course Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, Profit (1921).“Keynes Chapter 12” uncertainty alludes to Chapter 12 of Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money
(1936) wherein also can be found the coining of the term “animal spirits” as employed in
financial market contexts. See also John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability 75–76,
315 (1921); and Daniel Ellsberg,“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms,” 75 Q. J. Econ.
643 (1961). For more on non-Bayesian “info-gap” decision theory and its possible suitability
to radically uncertain decision-making contexts, see, e.g., Yakov Ben-Heim, Info-Gap Decision
Theory: Decisions Under Extreme Uncertainty (2d ed., 2006).

10. See again Hockett,“Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3. See also my posting on the subject on
the Dorf on Law weblog this past September, available at www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/09/
what-maynard-keynes-james-dean-and-now.html.
11. The typical game of “chicken” differs the generic “prisoners’ dilemma” game in one
important respect: retaliation constitutes the best non-cooperative strategy in the latter
case but not in the former, since retaliation in the former results in the death of both
players. The variant of “chicken” that I model here, possessed as it is of “safety nets,”
accordingly lies somewhere between garden variety “chicken” and “prisoners’ dilemma.”
12. See again Hockett,“Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3 for detail.
13. The allusion is to former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s devotion to Ms. Rand.
14. See again Hockett,“Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3 for more on this history.
15. Consumer price inflation is characterized by the same prisoners’ dilemma structure as
characterizes asset price bubbles, which indeed can be viewed simply as cases of asset price
hyperinflation. Again see Hockett,“Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3.
16. The quoted nostrums were popularized by Martin. See id.
17. With “lost decade,” I am alluding to the protracted slump, now rather more than a
decade in duration, that Japan has suffered since the collapse of its stock and commercial
real estate price bubbles of the late 1980s. With “lost health,” I am alluding to a recent report
in the New York Times on the health consequences of long-term unemployment. Finally,
with “lost wealth,” I am alluding to all of the production that is foregone during periods of
capacity-underutilization, as during recessions.
18. See 12 USC 225a.
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